StatementRetirement Conference and the Intended RoutesLieutenant Colonel Alfred Ollivant wrote that the decision to retire from Antwerp was reached by General Paris at about 5.30 p.m. on 8th October, 1914, and communicated verbally at a staff conference attended by Colonel Seely, Lt-Colonel Ollivant, Major Richardson and Captain Sketchley. He stated that it was agreed the 1st Brigade (Commodore Henderson) would be communicated with and withdrawn by Colonel Seely; the Royal Marine Brigade in the centre by Lt-Colonel Ollivant; and the 2nd Brigade by Captain Sketchley, with Major Richardson and Lieutenant-Colonel Farquharson to prepare for the crossings. He stated that withdrawal was to begin “as soon as possible”, but that he did not take this to mean the withdrawal of all three brigades was necessarily to be simultaneous. He described two bridges: the 1st Brigade and Royal Marine Brigade were to retire by the Malines Gate and the City Pontoon Bridge at the Tête de Flandres, while the 2nd Brigade was to retire by the Gare de Formation and the Southern Pontoon Bridge near the petroleum stores. He stated that “ZWYNDRECHT POST OFFICE” was selected as the rendezvous point for commanding officers after crossing the river. Delivering Orders to Backhouse, Henderson, and the Marines Lt-Colonel Ollivant then wrote that, as “Chief Staff Officer”, he conceived it his duty to ensure all three orders reached their destination and to co-ordinate the movement. He stated that he first went to the 2nd Brigade Headquarters (Commodore Backhouse) at Wilryk Railway Station and communicated the plan, telling Commodore Backhouse that he considered it desirable that retirement should take place as far as possible “in succession from the left”, initiated by the 1st Brigade under Commodore Henderson. He stated Commodore Backhouse said he would order retirement of his brigade at 10 p.m. Lt-Colonel Ollivant then wrote that he went to the Headquarters of the 1st Brigade and communicated the order for Commodore Henderson to retire “forthwith” via the Porte de Malines and the City Bridge, adding that the 2nd Brigade was retiring at 10 p.m. He stated that Commodore Henderson advanced arguments for retiring by the other bridge and asked him to sanction the alteration; Lt-Colonel Ollivant wrote that he replied he could not authorise any change and that if circumstances made it necessary to depart from the order, Commodore Henderson must act on his own responsibility. He further wrote that a delay was raised: as he was leaving, the Brigade Major said the retirement could not start until 9 p.m. and asked him to sanction this. Lt-Colonel Ollivant wrote that he replied the orders were that retirement was to begin as soon as possible. He then stated that he went to the Royal Marine Brigade Headquarters at Warschot, communicated the order to retire via the Porte de Malines and City Pontoon Bridge, and that the battalions fell in and marched off by the right road. He then returned to the 2nd Brigade Headquarters and found it deserted, concluding the staff had gone to make arrangements. Night Movement, Confusion, and Claim to Have Been Unaware Until Ostend Lt-Colonel Ollivant wrote that he returned to Antwerp to report and find out what was happening elsewhere, but his car was disabled by nails (puncturing tyres), and on reaching Headquarters (which he found empty) he spent time searching hotels as to where Headquarters had moved. He then went to the City Bridge about 11.30 p.m., ascertained that the Royal Marine Brigade and some naval troops had already crossed, and remained anxious about the 1st Brigade. He stated that after waiting until after 2 a.m. he concluded the 1st Brigade must have crossed by the Southern Bridge. He wrote that at Beveren Waes he met General Paris and Captain Sketchley and was informed all naval brigades were across and were to push on to St. Gilles Waes for entrainment. He stated he spent the remainder of the night trying to reduce confusion on the roads, and that he did not become aware that the main body of the 1st Brigade had not arrived “in safety” until he reached Ostend. TestimonyThe Conference, the Plan, and His RoleUnder examination, Lt-Colonel Ollivant stated he acted as Chief Staff Officer to General Paris but had not been formally appointed. He described the conference as taking place between 5 and 6 p.m., and stated that an order was received from Lord Kitchener “I believe by telephone” that they were to retreat. He said General Paris informed the staff that retreat had been decided, and that he (Lt-Colonel Ollivant) was directed to draw up suggestions as to how it should be carried out — though he then said he could not remember whether the suggestions came from General Paris or from himself. In describing brigade dispositions he misstated them in a way the Court allowed to stand in the record: he placed Commodore Backhouse on the right, Commodore Henderson in the centre, and the Royal Marine Brigade on the left, then stated that two brigades (Henderson’s and the Royal Marines) would withdraw through the town and Backhouse’s by the outside bridge. He stated it was then decided that Major (Captain) Sketchley would personally supervise Backhouse’s withdrawal, Colonel Seely would supervise Commodore Henderson’s, and Lt-Colonel Ollivant would supervise the Royal Marine battalions; he then said that as senior staff officer he thought it his duty to go to all three brigade commanders to tell them what had been arranged. When he came to his conversation with Commodore Henderson, Lt-Colonel Ollivant testified that he told Commodore Henderson the orders were to retire through a main gate and over the main bridge in Antwerp. He stated that Commodore Henderson wished to go over the other bridge behind Commodore Backhouse, and asked if the orders could be altered; Lt-Colonel Ollivant stated that he told him he had no authority to alter orders, but that if the situation later changed such that it was impossible or inadvisable to go by the Malines Gate and Antwerp bridge, Commodore Henderson must act on his own responsibility. Anxiety for the 1st Brigade and Being Reassured They Were “On Ahead” Lt-Colonel Ollivant testified that after finding Headquarters empty he went to the City Bridge and made “most anxious enquiries” about Commodore Henderson’s brigade. He said answers puzzled him: some swore they had seen a battalion of sailors cross, others swore they had not. He stated he remained until about one o’clock, then later met General Paris and Major Sketchley and communicated his anxieties. He testified that he was told, “It is alright, they are on ahead,” and that he believed this reassurance came from either General Paris or Major Sketchley. Written Orders: Hesitation, Qualification, and Shifting Sequence Questioning later returned to whether orders were issued in writing. Lt-Colonel Ollivant replied, “I don’t think so,” then qualified this repeatedly: he did not think he wrote out orders; there was a great hurry; he did not think orders were written; but he was “not sure.” When asked whether the orders were definite and urgent — “as soon as possible” — he asked for time to think, then began to describe an order of withdrawal and route arrangements, while also introducing uncertainty about whether Commodore Henderson might have wished to withdraw after Backhouse and whether other arrangements existed. In the same run of answers, his narrative of sequencing and who withdrew when becomes unstable: at one moment he described a sequence in which the Royal Marine Brigade was withdrawn first, then Commodore Henderson’s brigade covered by a marine battalion, and Backhouse last — then immediately cautioned that he was not prepared to swear to that on oath. Returning to Commodore Henderson: Modifying Answers and Uncertainty on Rendezvous Later questioning again returned to his meeting with Commodore Henderson: who was present, whether a map was used, whether the route was written down, and whether he told Commodore Henderson that Colonel Seely would supervise his withdrawal. On several points Lt-Colonel Ollivant moved from assertion to qualification: he “thought” there was a map; he was “almost sure”; he did not “think” he wrote anything down; he could not remember whether he said anything about Seely bringing orders. On the rendezvous point, when pressed about place names, he became increasingly unwilling to commit himself, ultimately stating he wished to modify his answer and that he was speaking “in the absence of memory, of what I think,” and that he would not like to be sure. Conference Again: Not Remembering Richardson Writing the Order When directly asked whether Major Richardson wrote the retirement orders, Lt-Colonel Ollivant answered, “I do not,” and similarly did not remember whether General Paris gave orders to assembled officers or wrote them out. He also stated he did not remember any discussion as to whether written orders should be issued. Hearing Nothing Until Ostend; Cross-Examination by Commodore Henderson Lt-Colonel Ollivant stated he did not think he heard the 1st Brigade was missing until he reached Ostend. He also gave evidence on confusion of command, stating it was hard to say who was commanding at times, and that Mr Churchill gave directions. A notable exchange occurred when Commodore Henderson produced a copy of an order dated 6th October, 1914, and asked by whose authority it had been issued, pointing out that it did not seem possible for it to have been issued by General Paris given where General Paris’s headquarters were. Lt-Colonel Ollivant could not assist beyond presuming it was on General Paris’s authority; after inspecting the document he stated he did not know and had nothing to add. When the President suggested whether it might have been issued by the First Lord, Lt-Colonel Ollivant replied that he did not think it was issued by the First Lord. The Disappeared Copy of an Order Finally, the Court addressed a typewritten copy of an order signed by Lt-Colonel Ollivant, with no “To…” line and appearing to be an extract without preamble. Commodore Henderson stated that he had brought the original to the enquiry, placed it on the table with his papers, and that it had since disappeared. The President observed that it appeared to be part of a Divisional Order by Brigadier-General Paris but did not state to whom it was addressed. Assessment of the EvidenceLt-Colonel Ollivant’s evidence is central because he presents himself as the staff officer attempting to ensure the retirement orders were delivered and co-ordinated, and because his account directly touches the key question of what Commodore Henderson was told, by whom, and with what clarity.However, his testimony also exhibits a marked pattern under sustained questioning: firm statements are repeatedly softened into qualifications (“I think”, “I do not remember”, “I am not prepared to swear”), and on several points his narrative shifts as the questioning tightens — notably on whether orders were written, the sequencing of withdrawals, and what precisely he communicated regarding supervision by Colonel Seely. This is particularly significant because his uncertainty about written orders stands in tension with other evidence describing a written order being produced, read aloud, and copied. Lt-Colonel Ollivant does not merely say he did not receive a written order; he repeatedly indicates he cannot remember whether orders were written at all, and cannot recall Richardson writing them, even when directly asked. His evidence concerning the 1st Brigade’s fate is also revealing. He acknowledges anxiety at the City Bridge and says he communicated that anxiety when he later met General Paris and Major Sketchley, yet accepts reassurance on “sufficient evidence” that the Brigade was “on ahead”. He then maintains he did not learn of the Brigade’s absence until Ostend, despite the concern he says he felt at the time. Finally, the exchanges involving Commodore Henderson’s documents — including the question of whose authority lay behind an earlier order, and the later discussion of an “extract” order signed by Lt-Colonel Ollivant with the original apparently disappearing at the enquiry — add an additional layer of uncertainty, not about operational events, but about the documentary record itself. Taken as a whole, Lt-Colonel Ollivant’s testimony reads less like a clear staff account of orders delivered and more like an account repeatedly revised as the questioning exposes gaps and inconsistencies. The Court’s record therefore leaves the reader with a strong impression of a witness attempting to reconcile recollection, responsibility, and documentary uncertainty — and doing so with increasing reluctance to commit himself as the examination proceeds. | ||||
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