REPORT OF THE COURT OF ENQUIRY INTO
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
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| Royal Naval Barracks, Chatham February, 24th. 1919. |
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Sir, In accordance with instructions contained in your Memorandum of the 8th February, 1919, we have held a strict and careful Enquiry into the circumstances in which the First Royal Naval Brigade came to be interned in Holland during the withdrawal of the Royal Naval Division from Antwerp in October, 1914, and we have the honour to submit the following report: The Court wishes to preface it by the statement that certain discrepancies will be found to occur in the written statements handed in, and in the evidence of the various witnesses, but it must be borne in mind that the events in connection with the report took place more than four years ago and most of those concerned have been through a great deal during that time, moreover the events themselves took place at a period of dire confusion and under very trying circumstances. It is to be regretted that documents which would have been of material value to the Court and which were handed in to the Admiralty, e. g. the original order for retreat written by Major Richardson, could not be obtained. It must further be noted that the evidence of Colonel Bridges is not forthcoming, as that Officer is in India. Commodore Henderson makes serious allegations against him, and it would not be fair to this Officer to accept everything without his having an opportunity of refuting them if possible. For the purposes of the report the Court has not considered it necessary to go further back than October 8th, 1914, when orders were issued for the retirement, except in so far as concerns the training and equipment of the Naval Division generally, which will be dealt with later on in the report. On October 8th, 1914, at about 5.30 p.m., a conference was held at which were present General Paris, and four, at any rate, of his Staff Officers: Colonel Ollivant, Colonel Seely, Major Richardson and Captain Sketchley, and at which it was decided in consequence of severe pressure by the enemy, resulting in the fall of two or more of the forts forming a portion of the Inner Defences of Antwerp, that the position was untenable, and that the Royal Naval Division should be withdrawn. The orders for the retirement were drawn up and at the express desire of Major Richardson were put in writing and were written by him. These orders were to be communicated to the Division as follows : | |||||
| Colonel Ollivant to the Marine Brigade. (In Reserve.) | |||||
| Colonel Seely to the First Brigade. (On the left of the line.) | |||||
| Captain Sketchley to the Second Brigade. (On the right of the line.) | |||||
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The evidence as to the orders being issued in writing in any form, is conflicting. General
Paris states that carbon copies were made and given to the three above named officers;
Major Richardson says he gave the Officers no copies; Colonel Seely states the orders in
writing were to follow; Colonel Ollivant thinks that no orders were written. What appears to be clear is that General Paris read to the assembled Officers the orders which had been written down by Major Richardson, and whether they took anything down in writing themselves, or not, they left the Conference to communicate these orders to the different Brigades. With regard to this, a very important point must be noticed. Colonel Seely left the Conference with the impression that he was to deliver the orders to the troops in the centre sector, and not to any specific unit, or to any individual Brigade Commander. This is apparently quite at variance with the orders given, or as they were meant to be understood by General Paris or as they were understood by Major Richardson and Colonel Ollivant. Captain Sketchley was unfortunately killed at a later period of the War. This was the first mistake or misunderstanding of several, which taken separately would not have been sufficient to cause the disaster to the First Brigade, but which taken collectively, undoubtedly led to its interment. Colonel Seely proceeded to a point on the Malines Road and there delivered the order for retirement to certain Officers, but not to the Headquarters of the First Brigade for whom they were intended. Among these Officers was Commander Campbell, Commanding the Drake Battalion of the First Brigade, who in his evidence states that he told Colonel Seely that before carrying out any orders of this nature, he must communicate with his Brigade Commander, Commodore Henderson, Colonel Seely, however, according to Commander Campbell's evidence, told that Officer that the remainder of the First Brigade had already retired, and on this Commander Campbell withdrew his Battalion which arrived safely at the rendezvous, the only Battalion of the First Brigade which subsequently escaped internment. This would appear to have been at about 7 p.m. This Battalion reached the Malines Gate at about 9.30 p.m. which was then open, a point which must be borne in mind when corning to deal with the other Battalions of the First Brigade. Colonel Seely gave to the Officer Commanding the Drake Battalion the route to follow, which was through the Malines Gate to the Northern Bridge. Colonel Seely says : "I had no clear orders" and also says that it is doubtful point whether his directions to the Officers whom he saw were to be taken as executive or not, thinking that written orders were to follow. This is quite contrary to the other evidence on this point. Colonel Ollivant as G.S.0.1. made it his duty to visit all three Brigade Headquarters, instead of only the Marine Brigade for which he was detailed, in order to be quite certain that orders for the retirement had been received by everybody concerned. Had he not done so it would appear that these orders would never have reached the First Brigade at all, other than the Drake Battalion withdrawn by Colonel Seely. On Colonel Ollivant's arrival at the First Brigade Headquarters at about 7 p.m., there appears to have been a discussion between him and Commodore Henderson which led to some delay, the First Brigade eventually not commencing their retirement until 10 p.m., some three hours after the time at which General Paris expected it would have begun. Owing to the length and from the nature, of this conversation, Commodore Henderson certainly did not gather that this matter was urgent. He himself has stated: "I was not aware of any need to hurry", this being quite contrary to the reality of the situation and the way in which it was regarded by General Paris. Retirement at night in the presence of a powerful enemy force, is a difficult operation at any time. With untrained and exhausted troops, with great shortage of Officers and the serious lack of maps that existed, there was bound to be a considerable amount of straggling and delay. The result being, that, taking the route skirting the town as they did, acting under orders previously received, no mention of the route through Malines Gate having been made to Commodore Henderson, according to his statement, it was not until 4.30 a.m., on the 9th., that after crossing the Scheidt, they arrived at the Rendezvous at Zwyndrecht to find no Divisional Staff there, and nothing in the way of food or orders, all of which Commodore Henderson expected. As regards the route there is a conflict of evidence; Commodore Henderson's contention is supported in written statements by his Staff Officers. On the other hand Colonel Ollivant, both in his letter to General Paris dated October 20th, 1914, and in his evidence, states definitely that the route through Malines Gate was in orders. It must be noted that according to the evidence of Commander Fargus that, had the First Brigade then attempted to go through the Malines Gate, they would not have been able to do so. General Paris had left Zwyndrecht at midnight, having been, he affirms, distinctly given to understand by Colonel Seely that the First Brigade had arrived safely, and states that it was not until October 10th, at Ostend, that he learned of the disaster which had befallen a portion of his Division. Commodore Henderson, on arrival at the rendezvous and finding nothing, either in the shape of supplies or orders, was naturally at a loss what to do next (it must be remembered that he was unaware of the intention to retire to Ostend, etc.) and leaving his men to rest, two precious hours at least were lost while he scoured the country in a Belgian Motor Car which he had happened to pick up, in search of Divisional Headquarters or some one from whom to obtain further orders, At Beveren Waes, Commodore Henderson was told by a seaman of the Second Brigade that the Division was bivouacked close by. He did not verify this information which turned out subsequently to be incorrect. He considered this fact to be in accordance with his belief that the troops were resting preparatory to taking up a fresh position. It was at Beveren Waes that a Marine Battalion came up from the rear and an Officer being questioned by the Commodore as to its destination told him that it was St.Gilles Waes, that being the first time that the Commodore had heard of this second rendezvous. It is necessary to bear in mind in connection with this that General Paris believed that he had joined up at Zwyndrecht and that therefore it was not necessary to leave orders for him. Commodore Henderson then went on to St.Gilles Waes, and there happening to get into telephone communication with Colonel Bridges, who was then at Selsaette, seventeen or eighteen miles further on, he was told how critical the position was, and thereupon sent his two Staff Officers, Captain Cunningham and Dyke, back along the road to bring the Brigade on at once. It was still at Beveren Waes with instructions to move to St. Gilles Waes by 4 p.m., the original intention having been to give them time at the former place to rest, and try and cook the raw meat which Commodore Henderson had managed to secure. Thus a further delay had been caused, but still no hint of a retirement to Ostend had then reached him and there was yet in his mind the probability of a fresh position being taken up somewhere short of that place. The head of the long straggling column arrived at St. Gilles Waes at about 3.45 p.m., and the men were put at once into the waiting train which Commodore Henderson had got hold of. But at 4.15., the station master informed him that the line was cut at Moerbeke, and that a refugee train was returning from that direction. Shortly afterwards this train arrived, and Commodore Henderson then took the decision to intern his force in Holland, as the only alternative to annihilation or capture by the enemy. The movements of the Hawke Battalion require a separate paragraph. This Battalion was delayed in leaving their trenches, but joined up with Commodore Henderson at Zwyndrecht. On the march to St. Gilles Waes they took a wrong turning, lost their way, and failed to get in touch again with the rest of the Brigade. They eventually got orders from the Brigade Major to intern together with the information that the remainder of the Brigade and staff was already in Holland. The above is a condensed and accurate account in the opinion of the Court, as to what happened as far as the First Brigade is concerned between the time the order for retirement was issued on the 8th and interment in Holland on the 9th. TO SUM UP. 1. The primary cause of the disaster was the late arrival of the First Brigade at the rendezvous at Zwyndrecht; this in turn being due to several contributory causes as follows: | |||||
| (a) | The non-delivery of General Paris' orders to Commodore Henderson by Colonel Seely. | ||||
| (b) | The delay due to the conversation between Colonel Ollivant and Commodore Henderson when the former went to see whether the orders for the retirement had been received. | ||||
| (c) | The fact that Commodore Henderson was not informed of, and consequently did not appreciate, the full extent of the intended retirement, and the importance of its being carried out without delay. | ||||
| (d) | The slow rate of marching due to the extreme exhaustion and enfeebled state of the men who had not had a night's rest or anything approaching it, for five days, and were without food and water, and whose equipment left everything to be desired. | ||||
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2. By this late arrival at the rendezvous the Headquarters of the Division was missed
and all contact with it and the remainder of the Division was lost. 3. The fact that no orders were left for Commodore Henderson at the rendezvous, due to General Paris understanding from General Seely that the First Brigade had arrived. 4. The commandeering by General Bridges of the motor car which had been allotted to Commodore Henderson, and which would probably have enabled him to keep in touch with the Headquarters of the Division, both before and after the retirement had commenced. 5. The further delay at Beveren Waes, due to the reason given in 1. (c ) 6. That the orders for the retirement were not issued in writing to the Brigade Commanders and that Colonel Ollivant G.S.0.1. did not see this carried out. Had this been done the misunderstanding of General Paris' orders conveyed by Colonel Seely and by Colonel Ollivant would not have occurred. 6. In view of the foregoing the Court is of opinion that a certain amount of blame is attached to Colonel Seely, Colonel Ollivant and Colonel Bridges for the reasons stated. Although it was not a contributory cause to the internment of the First Brigade, the Court wishes to draw attention to the fact that Colonel Bridges was aware at 1 p.m. on October, 9th. of the First Brigade having been left behind, at which time he was in telephonic communication with Commodore Henderson and General Paris was not made aware of it until October 10th at Ostend. The reason is not known. Further, according to Commander Campbell's statement, either General Paris or Colonel Bridges informed him at Beveren Waes, some time previously that the First Brigade was missing but General Paris states that it was not from him that this information was derived, and therefore the assumption, if Commander Campbell's evidence is accepted on this point - of which he is confident, is that Colonel Bridges so informed him. It is to be regretted that this Officer's evidence on this particular point is not available. If he knew, when he saw Commander Campbell at Beveren Waes in the early hours of October 9th, that the First Brigade was missing, steps could easily have been taken to get once more into touch with it. With regard to Commodore Henderson's decision to intern the Brigade in Holland at the time he did, the Court is of opinion that, taking into consideration of the position in which he found himself, coupled with the facts that his force was practically incapable of further fighting or marching, and the information he was for the first time, in receipt of, as regards the enemy, he was justified in that direction and no blame is attached to either him or to any Officer or man under his command. Finally, the Court wishes to state that in this opinion a very defmite contributory cause of the internment was the general conditions in which the Royal Naval Division was sent to Antwerp. Two Brigades out of three were almost entirely untrained, even to the use of the weapon of the infantryman, the rifle. They were, to a large percentage, unequipped with the vital necessities of a soldier, such as waterbottles, canteens, haversacks, bandoliers, great-coats, rifle-slings, pouches, entrenching tools and almost every form of wheeled or horse transport or water carts. For five days they received practically no supplies of food or water except a small amount obtained with great difficulty by the personal exertions of their Officers. These two Brigades were also some 60% short of Officers, and the majority of those they had were almost entirely untrained. Reference must also be made to General Paris's Staff, which was insufficient in numbers, and appears to have been picked up, as it were, casually, and in most cases the Officers had little or no Staff training. In General Paris's original report dated October 20th, 1914, he refers to the fact that the 10th Royal Marine Brigade which left the trenches at about the same time as the First Brigade was able to get through. This was unquestionably due to the superior marching powers of trained men, properly equipped and under trained Officers, which emphasises what has been said in the previous paragraph. | |||||
| Signed: | Rear Admiral The Honourable Victor A. Stanley, C.B., M.V.O. (President) | ||||
| Brigadier General C. Mc N. Parsons, C.B., R.M. | |||||
| Captain H.L.P. Heard, D.S.O., R.M. 24th February 1919. | |||||
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